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CORRECTING CORRECTIONAL SUICIDE: 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE  
HURDLES TO COMPREHENSIVE  
INMATE SUICIDE PREVENTION 
Abstract: Suicide is the leading cause of death in U.S. jails, and the second lead-
ing cause of death in U.S. prisons. Suicidal behavior among inmates largely 
stems from the custodial environment and inmates’ difficulties coping with incar-
ceration. Unfortunately, many correctional facilities lack the comprehensive sui-
cide prevention policies necessary to reduce inmate suicides. Under the qualified 
immunity doctrine, current law also shields correctional authorities from liability 
for failure to implement adequate suicide prevention programs in their facilities. 
As a result, corrections officials lack incentive to enhance their efforts toward re-
ducing inmate suicides, and families of inmate suicide victims have limited op-
portunities to seek justice. This Note argues that in order to reduce inmate sui-
cides and ensure the safety and health of incarcerated individuals, the federal 
government should condition funding to state and local correctional facilities on 
their implementation of reasonable and effective suicide prevention protocols. 
INTRODUCTION 
Christopher Barkes lived in Wilmington, Delaware and worked at the Pepsi 
Bottling Company.1 He and his wife, Karen, had two daughters: Alexandra and 
Brittany.2 Barkes’s life took a turn in 1997, when he killed two individuals in a 
drunk driving accident.3 He pled guilty to two counts of second-degree vehicular 
homicide, and was sentenced to two years in prison followed by an extended 
period of probation.4 The accident deeply affected Barkes, who subsequently 
suffered from overdoses, alcoholism, post-traumatic stress disorder, and bipolar 
disorder.5 He also attempted suicide four times: once in 1997, in 2003, and twice 
in September of 2004.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Christopher J. Barkes Obituary, DEL. ONLINE (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.legacy.com/
obituaries/delawareonline/obituary.aspx?page=lifestory&pid=146151850 [https://perma.cc/ZUC2-
RR3H]. 
 2 See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc. (Barkes II), 766 F.3d 307, 310 (3d. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. 
Ct. 2042 (2015). 
 3 See Complaint at 3, Barkes II, 766 F.3d 307 (No. 12-3074). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 310–11; Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. 
 6 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 310–11. 
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On November 13, 2004, law enforcement officials arrested Barkes for vio-
lating his probation sentence for a domestic abuse incident.7 Upon arrest, offi-
cials took him to the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution (“HRYCI”) in 
Wilmington, Delaware, where a contract nurse gave him a medical evaluation at 
intake.8 Barkes told the nurse that he had a history of psychiatric treatment and 
that he was on medications for bipolar disorder and depression.9 He also dis-
closed his attempted suicide in 2003, but indicated that he was not currently 
thinking about killing himself.10 Based on those responses, the nurse gave 
Barkes a routine referral to mental health services but did not initiate any special 
suicide prevention measures.11 Correctional staff then placed Barkes alone in a 
cell in the booking and receiving area of HRYCI.12 
Later that day, Barkes called his wife and told her that he “[couldn’t] live 
[that] way anymore,” and that he was going to kill himself.13 His wife did not 
inform the Delaware Department of Correction of the conversation, thinking that 
her husband would be safe in the facility, given that state officials and his proba-
tion officer knew about his prior suicide attempts.14 The next morning, correc-
tional staff found Barkes dead, hanging by a sheet from a steel partition in the 
ceiling of his cell.15 
In February of 2006, Barkes’s wife and two daughters filed a complaint on 
behalf of Barkes against Stanley Taylor, then-Delaware Commissioner of Cor-
rection, and Raphael Williams, then-Warden of HRYCI.16 Their claim was based 
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly known as Section 1983, which allows an indi-
vidual to sue government officials for depriving him or her of a constitutional 
right, privilege, or immunity, and to seek damages or other relief.17 The com-
                                                                                                                           
 7 Id. Barkes had violated his probation by loitering. Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 8 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 311. The contract nurse was employed by First Correctional Medical, a 
private contractor hired to provide medical services at the HRYCI. Id. 
 9 Id. at 314; Taylor v. Barkes (Barkes III), 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043 (2015); Brief for Respondents in 
Opposition at 4, Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (No. 14-939). 
 10 Barkes III, 125 S. Ct. at 2043. Barkes did not disclose his suicide attempts in 1997 or 2004. Id. 
 11 Id. An example of a suicide prevention measure used at the HRYCI is placement on Psychiatric 
Close Observation, Level II, which entails giving inmates suicide gowns (smocks made of heavy 
material that is difficult to tear) and requiring staff to check on the inmates every fifteen minutes. 
Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 311–12; Lindsay M. Hayes, Suicide Prevention in Correctional Facilities: 
Reflections and Next Steps, 36 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 188, 189 (2013) (explaining what a safety 
smock is). 
 12 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 311. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.; Brief for Respondents in Opposition, supra note 9, at 6. 
 15 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 312. 
 16 Id. at 310, 314. 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Barkes III, 125 S. Ct. at 2043; see Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court 
Jail Suicide Case Illustrates the Breadth of Qualified Immunity, VERDICT (June 3, 2015), https://
verdict.justia.com/2015/06/03/supreme-court-jail-suicide-case-illustrates-the-breadth-of-qualified-
immunity [https://perma.cc/L8TF-457E] (explaining the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and referring 
to the statute as “Section 1983”). The first sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who, 
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plaint alleged that Taylor and Williams violated Barkes’s Eighth Amendment 
right against cruel and unusual punishment by their deliberate indifference to 
Barkes’s serious medical needs, including failure to supervise and monitor First 
Correction Medical (“FCM”), the private contractor providing medical treatment 
at the HRYCI.18 The plaintiffs specifically pointed to evidence that the contract 
nurse was a licensed practical nurse, rather than a qualified mental health pro-
fessional, and argued that she was less qualified to evaluate inmates for mental 
health issues, such as suicide risk.19 They also contended that FCM’s suicide 
prevention screening practices relied on outdated guidelines by the National 
Commission on Correctional Healthcare, that FCM lacked access to Barkes’s 
probation records containing information about his history of mental health 
problems, and that FCM was intentionally understaffing HRYCI in order to 
increase profits.20 
Taylor and Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that as gov-
ernment officials they were entitled to qualified immunity, and therefore were 
not liable for Barkes’s death.21 The United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware denied the motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit affirmed.22 The Third Circuit held that Taylor and Williams were 
                                                                                                                           
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equi-
ty, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer 
for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
plaintiffs also filed state claims for wrongful death and survival actions. Complaint, supra note 3, at 
8–9. 
 18 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2043. 
 19 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 330. Qualified mental health professionals includes psychiatrists, psy-
chologists, psychiatric social workers, psychiatric nurses, and others who are legally authorized to 
evaluate and treat patients with mental health needs because of their education, credentials, and expe-
rience. Hayes, supra note 11, at 191. 
 20 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 330–31. 
 21 Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2043. Government officials are not held liable for their actions unless 
those actions violate a right that is “clearly established” in the law at the time of the conduct. Reichle 
v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). 
 22 Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2042–43. The Barkes family filed its complaint against Taylor and 
Williams on February 16, 2006, in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, and 
summary judgment was granted to Taylor and Williams. Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 314. The Barkeses 
filed an appeal, which was dismissed by a stipulation of both parties on July 9, 2008. Id. While that 
appeal was pending, the district court conducted a hearing on the Barkes family’s motion for default 
judgment. Id. at 315. The court ruled in favor of the Barkeses at that hearing, and the family filed a 
first amended complaint on June 13, 2008. Id. Taylor and Williams moved to strike the amended 
complaint, arguing that the claims asserted had already been dismissed previously on summary judg-
ment. Id. Although the district court granted the motion to strike, it also allowed the Barkes family to 
file a second amended complaint as long as it did not repeat the claims from the previous complaint. 
Id. The Barkeses filed a second amended complaint on April 9, 2009, which was dismissed, and then a 
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not entitled to qualified immunity because Barkes had suffered a deprivation of 
his constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to proper implementation 
of adequate suicide prevention protocols, and this right was clearly established at 
the time of the alleged misconduct.23 Taylor and Williams then petitioned for 
certiorari.24 
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion, holding that the qualified immunity doctrine protected the commissioner 
and warden from the Barkes family’s claim.25 Rather than request an oral argu-
ment to consider whether any constitutional rights were violated in Barkes’s 
case, or to clarify the scope for supervisory liability and the standard for quali-
fied immunity, the Court simply filed a short, per curiam opinion dismissing the 
claim.26 The Court reasoned that there was no violation of clearly established 
law because none of its prior decisions established a right to proper implementa-
tion of adequate suicide prevention protocols, or even discussed suicide screen-
ing or prevention protocols.27 Therefore, the Court concluded that the officials 
were entitled to qualified immunity.28 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Taylor v. Barkes leaves inmates with no 
guarantee to suicide prevention measures.29 Suicide has caused the majority of 
                                                                                                                           
third amended complaint on April 22, 2010, in which they included an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. 
Taylor and Williams filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint on May 6, 2010, which 
was denied. Id. Both parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, at which point Taylor 
and Williams invoked qualified immunity for the first time. Id. The district court denied both motions 
for summary judgment, and the Barkeses filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit. Id. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, which al-
lows the review of orders denying qualified immunity at summary judgment when the denial turns on 
questions of law. Id. at 315–16. 
 23 Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 327–28. 
 24 Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. 
 25 Id. at 2045. 
 26 Id. at 2043–44; see Lisa Soronen, Prison Officials Get Qualified Immunity in Inmate Suicide, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES BLOG (June 5, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/06/05/prison-
officials-get-qualified-immunity-in-inmate-suicide.aspx [https://perma.cc/72CE-KHJV] (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear oral argument in Barkes’s case). A per curiam opinion is an un-
signed opinion written on behalf of the entire court. Glossary of Legal Terms, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 10, 
2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/glossary-of-legal-terms/ [https://
perma.cc/NSB8-VPR8]. Supervisory liability refers to the personal liability of a government official 
whose subordinate acts in violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. See Barkes II, 766 F.3d at 
316. Supervisory liability may attach if the subordinate “established and maintained a policy, practice 
or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm” or if the supervisor “participated in violat-
ing the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of 
and acquiesced” in the unconstitutional act. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. 
Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)). Claims regarding a supervisor’s 
failure to do something—such as train, discipline, or supervise—fall into the subcategory of policy or 
practice liability. Id. The Court declined to rule on the issue of supervisory liability and only reversed 
on qualified immunity. See Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2043. 
 27 Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. 
 28 Id. at 2045. 
 29 See Dorf, supra note 17. 
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deaths in local jails in America each year between 2000 and 2014.30 The number 
of suicides in local jails rose 13% between 2013 and 2014, from 328 suicides to 
372.31 In 2014, the suicide rate in local jails was fifty per 100,000 inmates, 
which has been the highest suicide rate among local jails since 2000.32 In 2014, 
7% of all deaths in state prisons were the result of suicides—the largest percent-
age of deaths in state prisons due to suicide since 2001.33 In 2006, the suicide 
rate in detention facilities—where individuals are detained for more than forty-
eight hours, but less than two years—was thirty-six deaths per every 100,000 
inmates, which is approximately three times greater than that in the general non-
incarcerated population.34 The slow progress in inmate suicide prevention is at-
tributable to a lack of comprehensive suicide prevention policies in correctional 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 
2000–2014—STATISTICAL TABLES 5 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mlj0014st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BQ3R-6B2B] (showing that suicide was the leading cause of death in local jails 
between 2000–2014, when considering all the illnesses as separate causes of death); BUREAU OF JUS-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–
2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0013st.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A3FA-WHHW] (stating that since 2000, suicide has been the leading cause of death in local 
jails each year). In response to the suicide of a former inmate in Texas, Sandra Bland, the Huffington 
Post gathered data from news reports, press releases, official records, and phone calls to compile an 
unofficial database of inmate deaths in jails and police lockups between July 13, 2015, and July 13, 
2016. Since Sandra, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2016), http://data.huffingtonpost.com/2016/jail-
deaths [https://perma.cc/X4MX-QX4G]. According to the database, there were 256 inmate suicides in 
jails and police lockups across all fifty states between July 13, 2015 and July 13, 2016. Id. (to retrieve 
the data on suicide, scroll down to “Jail Deaths Database,” find the dropdown list titled “Cause of 
death,” and select “Suicide/Apparent Suicide”). The Huffington Post states that the numbers in the 
database are likely lower than the actual numbers, because many states do not collect data on inmate 
mortality, some agencies did not respond to requests for information, and deaths in smaller jails are 
not always made public. Id. Suicide is more prevalent in local jails than in state prisons, where various 
types of illness are the leading causes of death, and suicide is the next leading cause of death. See 
MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2013, supra, at 1, 20 (stating that suicide has 
been the leading cause of death in local jails since 2000, and showing that in state prisons, the number 
of deaths due to various illnesses caused the majority of deaths but that suicide was still the next lead-
ing cause of death after some of these illnesses). The rate of suicide in state prisons, however, still 
remains greater than that in the general non-incarcerated population. NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER 2 (2010), https://s3.
amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/024308.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9LL-WX76]. Some reasons 
for the higher rate of suicide in local jails are the initial shock of confinement, the fact that jails have 
less information on inmates upon arrival, and because prison policies are under greater scrutiny by 
accreditors. Maurice Chammah & Tom Meagher, Why Jails Have More Suicides Than Prisons, MAR-
SHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/why-jails-have-more-
suicides-than-prisons#.IZUCfRuiE [https://perma.cc/A23Y-N9AE]. 
 31 MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000–2014, supra note 30, at 1. 
 32 Id. at 2. 
 33 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MORTALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 
2001–2014—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msp0114st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G7FT-HWJZ]. 
 34 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 2, 45. 
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facilities across the United States.35 Such policies should be legally required in 
all correctional facilities in order to reduce the rate of suicide in jails and prisons 
across the country.36 
Because the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Barkes declined to recognize that 
an inmate’s right to effective suicide prevention measures is clearly established, 
officials at correctional facilities are protected from liability by qualified immun-
ity even if their suicide prevention measures are flawed.37 This immunity exists 
even if the defective suicide prevention protocols are directly linked to an in-
crease in inmate suicide at their correctional facilities.38 Correctional officials at 
a facility that has no suicide prevention protocols may still avoid liability for 
inmate suicide deaths under the doctrine of qualified immunity.39 The Barkes 
holding has left families of inmate suicide victims with few avenues for retribu-
tion.40 
This Note examines the status of the law regarding correctional liability for 
defective suicide prevention protocols, and the importance of ensuring the im-
plementation of comprehensive suicide prevention policies in order to reduce 
inmate suicide.41 Part I discusses the qualified immunity doctrine, and how it has 
shielded correctional officers from liability in inmate suicide cases.42 Part II ex-
plains the necessary components of an effective suicide prevention strategy, the 
current state of suicide prevention programming in jails, and the reasons why 
inadequate programming has led to an increase in inmate suicide.43 Finally, to 
provide greater protection to inmates at risk of suicide, Part III recommends that 
the federal government condition correctional funding for state and local gov-
ernments on their implementation of reasonable and effective suicide prevention 
programs in their correctional facilities.44 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See generally Hayes, supra note 11 (describing the antiquated views of correctional leaders 
regarding what it takes to prevent inmate suicides and recommending guidelines for improvement). 
 36 See generally id. (same); Annette Hanson, Correctional Suicide: Has Progress Ended?, 38 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE 6, 6 (2010), http://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/38/1/6.full.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZC8Y-2HB3] (suggesting that progress in preventing inmate suicides is declining and that 
current correctional suicide prevention measures should be updated and improved). 
 37 Dorf, supra note 17. 
 38 See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Barkes to extend immunity to the 
jail officials, despite the possibility that the jail’s suicide prevention measures were defective and 
therefore led to the failure to prevent Barkes’s death). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. (noting that the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Section 1983 actions on qualified immun-
ity grounds prevents any meaningful analysis of whether a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were actual-
ly violated, thereby creating a barrier for future plaintiffs). See generally Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. 2042 
(finding that Taylor and Williams were entitled to qualified immunity, without discussing whether 
Barkes’s constitutional rights were violated). 
 41 See infra notes 45–261 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 45–101 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 102–194 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 195–261 and accompanying text. 
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I. CORRECTIONAL LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SUICIDE  
PREVENTION PROTOCOLS 
Inmate suicide is largely attributable to the lack of comprehensive suicide 
prevention protocols in jails and prisons.45 Unfortunately, because of the current 
law’s treatment of government officials, families of inmate suicide victims have 
limited means for retribution, and correctional facilities have little incentive to 
pursue change.46 Government officials in inmate suicide cases—namely, correc-
tional leaders and officers—are protected under the doctrine of qualified immun-
ity, which shields them from liability so long as their actions did not violate an 
inmate’s constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the al-
leged improper conduct.47 Section A discusses the origins of the qualified im-
munity doctrine and the development of the “clearly established” standard.48 
Section B examines how the qualified immunity doctrine has been applied to 
correctional suicide cases.49 
A. Qualified Immunity and the “Clearly Established” Standard 
The qualified immunity doctrine—a doctrine established by common 
law—allows government officials, including correctional officers, to avoid 
civil damages liability as long the conduct in question did not violate a statuto-
ry or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the inci-
dent.50 The doctrine of qualified immunity balances the need to hold public 
officials accountable for abuses of power, and the government’s interest in pro-
tecting officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform 
their duties in a reasonable manner.51 Qualified immunity also ensures that of-
ficials are on notice of what actions could be considered as unlawful conduct 
within their duties.52 A variety of both state and federal government officials 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 188 (describing the antiquated views of correctional leaders re-
garding what it takes to prevent inmate suicides and recommending guidelines for improvement). 
 46 See Dorf, supra note 17 (describing how the qualified immunity doctrine shields corrections 
officials from liability even when their facilities do not take adequate inmate suicide prevention 
measures). 
 47 See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (defining qualified immunity); Soronen, supra note 26 (explaining 
that the corrections officials in Taylor v. Barkes received qualified immunity). 
 48 See infra notes 50–81 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 82–101 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (defining qualified immunity); Dorf, supra note 17 (explaining 
that the qualified immunity doctrine is one of several limitations placed by the Supreme Court on 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 actions). Although government officials use qualified immunity as a defense in actions 
stemming from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the qualified immunity doctrine is not explicitly mentioned in the 
text of the statute; rather, the doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court. See Dorf, supra note 
17 (same). 
 51 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 52 Id. at 244 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). 
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enjoy qualified immunity, including prison guards, school officials, health care 
providers, welfare administrators, and government employers.53 
One of the first qualified immunity cases before the United States Su-
preme Court was Pierson v. Ray, which involved an action based on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against police officers who had arrested several individuals for violat-
ing a Mississippi statute that was later declared unconstitutional.54 The Su-
preme Court held that although common law did not give police officers com-
plete immunity from liability, existing case law did shield an officer from lia-
bility when he or she acted according to a statute that at the time, he or she rea-
sonably believed was valid, but that was later found to be unconstitutional.55 
Following Pierson, two cases—Scheuer v. Rhodes and Wood v. Strick-
land—contributed significantly to the development of the law of qualified im-
munity.56 In these cases, the Supreme Court developed the concept of immuni-
ty for public officials and clarified its scope.57 In Scheuer, the Court rejected 
the idea of giving government officials absolute immunity, and instead defined 
a standard of qualified immunity involving both objective and subjective com-
ponents.58 The Court held that objectively, there must be reasonable grounds 
                                                                                                                           
 53 John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 851 
(2010). 
 54 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549–50 (1967); Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1155, 1159 (2005) (explaining that Pierson was the first qualified immunity case before 
the Supreme Court). The police officers had arrested several white and African American clergymen 
who attempted to use segregated facilities at a bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi, under a Missis-
sippi statute that prohibited individuals from congregating in a public place and refusing to leave 
when ordered by law enforcement. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 548–49. 
 55 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555. 
 56 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 309–10 (1975) (involving a lawsuit by public school stu-
dents against their school administrators who suspended them); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
234, 235 (1974) (analyzing whether Ohio’s governor was accountable for his misuse of the National 
Guard); John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2012) (ex-
plaining that the origins of the qualified immunity doctrine were in Wood and Scheuer). In Scheuer, 
the representatives of the estates of three deceased students, who had been attending Kent State Uni-
versity, sued the governor of Ohio, members of the National Guard, and the president of Kent State 
University for intentionally and recklessly deploying the National Guard on the Kent State University 
campus, resulting in the students’ deaths. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234, 235. In Wood, the school adminis-
trators had expelled the two high school students for violating a school regulation that prohibited the 
use or possession of alcohol at school or school activities. Wood, 420 U.S. at 310. 
 57 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 322 (holding that a school board member is not protected from liability 
if he knew or reasonably should have known that his actions, taken as part of his official duties, would 
violate a student’s constitutional rights, or if he maliciously intended to violate a student’s constitu-
tional rights through his actions); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48 (holding that qualified immunity is 
available to government officials in the executive branch, subject to variation depending on the scope 
of their discretion and responsibilities, and that officials must have a reasonable belief and good faith 
basis for their actions in order to invoke immunity). 
 58 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243, 247–48 (finding that qualified immunity does not provide gov-
ernment officers with absolute immunity in lawsuits based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that in order for 
qualified immunity to apply, officers must have both a reasonable belief and good faith basis for the 
conduct in question); Williams, supra note 56, at 1300–01 (noting that the Court in Scheuer rejected 
2018] Qualified Immunity as a Hurdle to Inmate Suicide Prevention 1405 
for the accused officer’s belief that the conduct was lawful at the time of the 
act, and considering all of the circumstances surrounding the instance; from a 
subjective standpoint, the officer must have also acted in good faith with the 
law on the books at the time of the incident.59 In order to satisfy the threshold 
requirement for qualified immunity, the Court ruled that an officer must meet 
both the objective and subjective aspects of the inquiry.60 The Court also held 
that qualified immunity is available to officers in the executive branch of gov-
ernment, but that the scope of immunity would vary depending on the officer’s 
responsibilities and ability to exercise discretion.61 
In Wood, the Court reiterated that a court must consider both the objective 
and subjective elements discussed above when determining whether qualified 
immunity is available to a government official.62 Unlike in Scheuer, however, 
where the objective aspect of the inquiry focused on the reasonable belief of 
the officer at the time of the incident, the Court in Wood narrowed the focus of 
the objective inquiry to the government officials’ knowledge of the law.63 
Therefore, under Scheuer and Wood, government officials in the executive 
branch were protected by qualified immunity if they satisfied both the objec-
tive and subjective aspects of the inquiry—that is, if the official in question 
reasonably lacked knowledge that his or her conduct would violate a constitu-
tional right, and acted in good faith on that knowledge.64 
Seven years later, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court considered 
the type of immunity that should be available to senior aides and advisers to 
the President.65 In deciding this issue, the Court eliminated the subjective ele-
ment of the qualified immunity test, in favor of a purely objective test similar 
to the one set forth in Wood.66 The Court held that in general, government offi-
                                                                                                                           
the idea of absolute immunity and found that in order for the qualified immunity defense to be suc-
cessful, both objective and subjective factors must be present). 
 59 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48 (holding that in order for qualified immunity to apply, officers 
must have both a reasonable belief and good faith basis for the conduct in question); Williams, supra 
note 56, at 1300–301 (explaining that in Scheuer, the Court’s qualified immunity analysis involved 
both objective and subjective factors). 
 60 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48 (same); Williams, supra note 56, at 1300–01 (same). 
 61 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247. 
 62 Wood, 420 U.S. at 321. 
 63 See id. at 322 (holding that in the context of school discipline, a school board member may be 
liable for an action if he knew, or reasonably should have known, that the action would violate the 
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he acted with the intent to deprive students of their 
rights); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247 (holding that in order for qualified immunity to apply, officers must 
have both a reasonable belief and good faith basis for the conduct in question); Williams, supra note 
56, at 1301 (noting the distinction between Wood and Scheuer). 
 64 Wood, 420 U.S. at 322; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48. 
 65 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982). 
 66 See id. at 818 (holding that government officers performing discretionary duties are generally 
not liable for actions that do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a 
reasonable person would have known); Wood, 420 U.S. at 322 (holding that in the context of school 
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cials with responsibilities requiring discretion are free from liability, as long as 
they do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”67 Harlow made it more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to bring allegations of constitutional violations to trial, be-
cause conducting an objective analysis of the state of the law made it easier for 
a court to dismiss a claim at summary judgment; as such, Harlow limited the 
opportunity for plaintiffs to argue the intent of the accused government official 
within open court.68 The new test was also problematic because of the difficul-
ty of defining the nature of a “clearly established” right under the law.69 As 
Justice Powell mentioned in his dissent in Wood, it is dangerous to expect all 
government officials to know whether a right is clear or settled, as even courts 
disagree and change positions over time.70 
The Supreme Court clarified what satisfies a “clearly established” right in 
the 1987 case Anderson v. Creighton.71 In his opinion for the majority, Justice 
Antonin Scalia explained that for a right to be “clearly established,” it must be 
particularized, and not overly general or abstract.72 According to Justice Scalia, 
“the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear,” putting a reasonable offi-
cial on notice that his or her conduct violates that right.73 Justice Scalia also 
added that although the “clearly established” standard does not require a plain-
tiff to demonstrate that the accused official’s specific act was unlawful at the 
                                                                                                                           
discipline, a school board member may be liable for an action if he knew, or reasonably should have 
known, that the action would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he acted 
with the intent to deprive students of their rights); Williams, supra note 56, at 1302 (noting the simi-
larity between the objective tests in Harlow and Wood). 
 67 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The court reasoned that relying on the objective reasonableness of an 
official’s conduct based on clearly established law would “avoid excessive disruption of government 
and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Id. 
 68 See Williams, supra note 56, at 1303 (arguing that Harlow restricted plaintiffs from bringing 
allegations of constitutional violations to trial). 
 69 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (explaining the “clearly established” standard); Wood, 420 U.S. at 
329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“One need only look to the decisions of this 
Court—to our reversals, our recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits—to recog-
nize the hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are ‘unquestioned constitutional rights.’”). 
 70 Wood, 420 U.S. at 329. 
 71 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637, 641 (1987) (analyzing federal law enforcement 
officers’ warrantless search of a home, which they claimed was justified on the grounds of “exigent 
circumstances”). An exigent circumstance, sometimes also referred to as an “urgent need,” arises 
when law enforcement officers face a need requiring them to obtain a warrant without delay. Dorman 
v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Some factors to be considered when determining 
whether an exigent circumstance existed are the seriousness of the offense, whether the suspect was 
armed, and the likelihood of the suspect escaping if not promptly apprehended. Id. at 392–93. 
 72 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
 73 Id. Applying these principles to the case, the majority held that qualified immunity was availa-
ble to the officers for their warrantless search of a third party’s home in search of fugitives. Id. at 646. 
The majority explained that in light of clearly established law, the officers could have reasonably 
believed that there was an exigent circumstance and that their warrantless search of the home was 
proper. Id. at 641. 
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time it was carried out, it does mean that the unlawfulness of the action must 
have been “apparent,” in view of prior case law.74 Because of Anderson, quali-
fied immunity is available to government officials unless their conduct violates 
an established constitutional right, and at the time of the act, they reasonably 
knew that existing case law prohibited their specific conduct.75 
Although the Anderson decision currently provides courts with a defini-
tion of “clearly established,” this definition is blurry.76 How factually similar 
does a prior case need to be in order for a plaintiff to be able to use it to argue 
that a clearly established right exists?77 This blurriness also enables defendants 
to avoid liability by taking advantage of minor ambiguities in case law.78 
Qualified immunity, as defined by the case law discussed above, is avail-
able to government officials in the executive branch so long as the official in 
question did not knowingly violate a clearly established constitutional right by 
his or her conduct.79 Whether or not a right is clearly established depends on a 
court’s view of the clarity of existing case law, including whether there is con-
sensus among the Courts of Appeals.80 Correctional officers have also benefit-
                                                                                                                           
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified 
Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 454–55 (2000) (explaining that a clearly estab-
lished right must be one that is described with some particularity in order to put government officials 
on notice, and describing that definition of clearly established law as “blurry”). 
 77 See id. at 455 (explaining that the blurry definition of clearly established law allows courts to 
choose whether to apply a narrow or broad definition of “clearly established,” and that this choice is 
what determines the outcome of a case). 
 78 Dorf, supra note 17. For example, in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the school officials in question were entitled to qualified immunity, 
even though the officials violated a thirteen-year-old middle school student’s Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches when they subjected her to a strip search. 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009). 
The Court found that the strip search, which involved a search of a student’s bra and underpants for 
school-banned drugs, was not justified under the Fourth Amendment and the reasonableness test for 
school searches established in New Jersey v. T.L.O. See id. at 369, 375–77 (quoting New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1984)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Court concluded, how-
ever, that the right against an unreasonable school search was not clear enough from prior case law to 
have put the officials on notice that their conduct was unlawful. Safford, 557 U.S. at 378–79. The 
Court reasoned that the circuit courts had come to divergent conclusions regarding the reasonable 
scope of school strip searches, and that this difference in opinion rendered the right against unreason-
able school searches not sufficiently clear. Id. The court pointed to Williams v. Ellington, where the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a strip search of a high school student for 
a drug, without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to her body, and Thomas v. Roberts, where 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity to a teacher 
and police officer who conducted a group strip search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing 
twenty-six dollars. Id. at 378. The court also quoted the Eleventh Circuit in Jenkins v. Talladega City 
Board of Education, which found that the numerous interpretations of T.L.O. among courts, along 
with the variety of possible school settings in which these cases could occur, entitled the officials to 
qualified immunity. Id.; Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 79 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Wood, 420 U.S. at 321–22; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48. 
 80 Safford, 557 U.S. at 378–79; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
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ed from the qualified immunity defense when sued by family members seeking 
to impose liability for harms suffered by inmates.81 
B. Qualified Immunity in Inmate Suicide Cases 
Case law demonstrates that prison officials violate the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause when they are deliberately indif-
ferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate.82 In Farmer v. Bren-
nan, the Supreme Court defined the term “deliberate indifference,” by holding 
that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for de-
priving an inmate of humane treatment in confinement only if he or she knows 
that the inmate faces “a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk 
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”83 In so holding, the Court 
relied on its previous decisions, which had established that deliberate indiffer-
ence involved something between two extremes: negligence and the purposeful 
causing of harm through acts or omissions.84 The Court also looked to prior 
cases decided by the Courts of Appeals, which frequently compared deliberate 
indifference to recklessness.85 
Failure to implement adequate suicide prevention policies, however, is 
not considered an act of deliberate indifference, and the courts have not 
deemed the right to adequate suicide prevention policies as a “clearly estab-
lished” right.86 In Taylor v. Barkes, the Barkes family argued that the failure of 
the HRYCI warden and commissioner to supervise their contract medical 
workers amounted to deliberate indifference that resulted in Barkes’s suicide.87 
Still, the Supreme Court dismissed the claim because of qualified immunity, 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See generally Taylor v. Barkes (Barkes III), 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (holding that correctional 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity in a case where the family of a former inmate who com-
mitted suicide filed a lawsuit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding that state officials were entitled to qualified immunity in a case where the mother of a 
juvenile inmate filed a lawsuit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 82 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1993) (explaining that in the context of prison con-
ditions, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when their “state of mind is one of ‘deliberate 
indifference’ to inmate health and safety”). 
 83 Id. at 847. 
 84 Id. at 836. 
 85 Id. (citing LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993); Manarite v. City of 
Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 957 (1st Cir. 1992); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 347 (7th Cir. 
1991); Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 
848, 851–52 (4th Cir. 1990); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
 86 See Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2044–45 (finding that even if the facility’s suicide screening and 
prevention measures were deficient, the officials were not violating any clearly established rights, and 
therefore qualified immunity applied); Miller, 698 F.3d at 964–65 (holding that the facility’s place-
ment of mentally ill inmates in cells with bunk beds did not amount to deliberate indifference, and that 
even if it did, the law was not clearly established enough to overcome qualified immunity). 
 87 Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc. (Barkes II), 766 F.3d 307, 314 (3d. Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 
2042 (2015). 
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reasoning that the right to proper implementation of adequate suicide preven-
tion protocols was not clearly established at the time of Barkes’s death.88 The 
Court explained that, at the time of Barkes’s suicide, there were no existing 
cases that would have made it clear to the officers that they were overseeing a 
correctional system that violated the Constitution.89 The Court also noted that 
no decision of the Court had ever even discussed suicide screening or preven-
tion protocols.90 As such, the Court did not consider failure to provide ade-
quate suicide prevention protocols to be a deliberate indifference to an in-
mate’s constitutional rights.91 
Another recent case with a similar outcome is Miller v. Harbaugh, decid-
ed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.92 Jamal Mil-
ler was sixteen years old when he hung himself from the top bunk of his bed 
while incarcerated at the Illinois Youth Center (“IYC”) St. Charles.93 His 
mother sued a number of state officials, including the acting director of the 
Illinois’ Department of Juvenile Justice at the time of Jamal’s death, and the 
IYC St. Charles superintendent, for deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious 
mental illness, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.94 
Specifically, her claims focused on the officials’ adoption of certain living pol-
icies, including the use of bunk beds in the rooms of potentially suicidal in-
mates when history demonstrated that inmates used bunk beds to commit sui-
cide, and there was evidence that single beds were available.95 The Seventh 
Circuit ruled that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning 
that where an inmate does not appear to be on the verge of suicide, but merely 
mentally disturbed as Jamal was, the law as it stood at the time did not clearly 
require corrections personnel to take further action.96 Furthermore, the court 
stated that even if the decision to house mentally ill inmates in rooms with 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2044–45. The Supreme Court, in its per curiam opinion, dismissed the 
Barkes family’s claim, holding that that the warden and commissioner were entitled to qualified im-
munity. Id. In doing so, the Court did not deny that that there was evidence that Barkes’s constitution-
al right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. See id. at 2044 (noting the Third 
Circuit’s findings as to the facility’s inadequate supervision of its medical services contractor). The 
Court even acknowledged evidence of the contract nurse’s failure to comply with the screening stand-
ards required under contract, evidence that the nurse did not have access to Barkes’s probation records 
that shed light on his mental health history, and evidence that the medical contractor had been short-
staffing the facility in order to increase profits. Id. 
 89 Id. at 2045. 
 90 Id. at 2044. 
 91 See id. at 2044–45 (reversing the Third Circuit’s decision, which stated that the jail officials 
violated Barkes’s Eighth Amendment right to proper implementation of comprehensive suicide pre-
vention measures). 
 92 Miller, 698 F.3d at 964–65. 
 93 Id. at 957, 959. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 960–61. 
 96 Id. at 963. 
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bunk beds did amount to deliberate indifference, an inmate’s right to be housed 
in safe conditions was not a clearly established right, and therefore qualified 
immunity still applied.97 
Cases like Barkes and Miller highlight the reasons why jails and prisons 
should have and enforce adequate suicide prevention protocols.98 Under cur-
rent law, inmates do not have a right to adequate suicide prevention protocols, 
because courts do not consider prison officials’ failure to implement these pro-
tocols to be deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm to inmates.99 
Furthermore, even if correctional facilities have constitutionally defective sui-
cide prevention policies or no policies at all, the officers within the facilities 
are still protected from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity.100 As 
a result, inmates have no guarantee to a custodial environment in which their 
mental health needs are adequately addressed, and the families of inmate sui-
cide victims are thus left with limited opportunities to recover damages.101 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. at 964. 
 98 See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text (summarizing Barkes and Miller, two cases in 
which the Supreme Court shielded correctional leaders from liability even though their failure to im-
plement effective suicide prevention measures contributed to the deaths of two inmates). 
 99 See Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2044–45 (reversing the Third Circuit’s decision, which stated that 
the jail officials violated Barkes’s Eighth Amendment right to proper implementation of comprehen-
sive suicide prevention measures); Miller, 698 F.3d at 964 (finding that the facility’s failure to proper-
ly house a suicidal inmate did not amount to deliberate indifference). 
 100 See Barkes III, 135 S. Ct. at 2045 (finding that even if the facility’s suicide screening and 
prevention measures were deficient, the officials were not violating any clearly established rights, and 
therefore qualified immunity applied); Dorf, supra note 17 (suggesting that the Court’s decision in 
Barkes shields correctional leaders from liability even if their facilities fail to implement any suicide 
prevention measures whatsoever). Although qualified immunity does not protect government officials 
against suits for injunctive relief, a combination of judge-made doctrines and statutory obstacles se-
verely limit the availability of injunctive relief for inmates or families of deceased suicidal inmates 
seeking an improvement of correctional policies. Dorf, supra note 17. For example, in Farmer v. 
Brennan, the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of deliberate indifference, holding that a prison 
official may only be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if he or she “knows that inmates face a 
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate 
it.” 511 U.S. at 847; see Lori Whitten, Legal Liability Trends for Correctional Suicides, NAT’L INST. 
OF CORR. (July 16, 2012), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/mentalhealth/archive/2012/07/16/legal-
liability-trends-for-correctional-suicides.aspx [https://perma.cc/RUB3-9TPF] (explaining how Farmer 
narrowed the definition of deliberate indifference, making it more difficult for inmates and their fami-
lies to prevail against correctional authorities in suicide-related lawsuits). Also, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act creates additional obstacles by eliminating the ability of the courts to waive filings fees 
for indigent inmates, and only allowing inmates to be placed on a monthly payment plan. William C. 
Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 669 (2004). 
 101 Dorf, supra note 17. 
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II. THE INMATE SUICIDE CRISIS AND A NEED FOR ENHANCED 
CORRECTIONAL SUICIDE PREVENTION EFFORTS 
The most recent statistics on inmate suicide show that suicide has been the 
leading cause of death in local jails, and has been the second leading cause in 
state prisons.102 A variety of factors, both internal and external to an inmate, con-
tribute to suicidal behavior.103 These factors include isolation from family, loss 
of control, the shock of confinement, and being in an authoritarian environ-
ment.104 Despite the high rate of suicide in jails and prisons, courts seldom hold 
correctional authorities liable for inmate suicides or deficient suicide prevention 
policies in correctional facilities.105 Section A discusses the common reasons for 
inmate suicide.106 Section B outlines some basic strategies for effective inmate 
suicide prevention recommended by correctional and mental health experts.107 
Section C analyzes the current state of suicide prevention programming in cor-
rectional facilities across the country.108 Finally, Section D explores the reasons 
why correctional facilities are falling short of the standards needed for effective 
inmate suicide prevention.109 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2013, supra note 30, at 1 (stating 
that since 2000, suicide has been the leading cause of death in local jails); MORTALITY IN STATE 
PRISONS, 2001–2014, supra note 33, at 1 (explaining that suicides accounted for seven percent of all 
deaths in state prisons in 2014, the highest percentage of prison suicides since 2001). The overall 
decrease in inmate suicides over the years is largely due to enhanced research and understanding of 
jail suicides. See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at xiii. In 2000, Congress passed 
the Death in Custody Reporting Act, and it required every state that received prison construction fund-
ing to report “on a quarterly basis, information regarding the death of any person who is in the process 
of arrest, is en route to be incarcerated, or is incarcerated at a municipal or county jail, State prison, or 
other local or State correctional facility . . . .” Id. at 4–5; Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106–297, 114 Stat. 1045. Although the inmate suicide rate has decreased overall in the last 
twenty years, recent statistics suggest that progress in preventing inmate suicide is diminishing, and the 
need for change persists. See Hanson, supra note 36, at 6 (“[R]ecent data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics suggest that we may be reaching a point of diminishing progress in suicide prevention.”). 
 103 See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 1 (explaining that the jail environ-
ment and inmates’ experience of a crisis are the two main causes of jail suicide). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Dorf, supra note 17 (discussing how the qualified immunity doctrine shields correctional 
leaders from liability for failure to implement suicide prevention measures); Whitten, supra note 100 
(explaining how the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan narrowed the definition of delib-
erate indifference, making it more difficult for inmates and their families to prevail against correction-
al authorities in suicide-related lawsuits). 
 106 See infra notes 110–126 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 127–152 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 153–172 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 173–194 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Main Causes of Inmate Suicide 
Experts in mental health and corrections have identified the primary causes 
of jail suicide.110 One of their key conclusions is that the jail environment tends 
to promote suicidal behavior.111 For example, inmates often face isolation, un-
certainty about the future, shame, and dehumanization—sentiments that have 
serious negative impacts on mental health and encourage suicidal behavior.112 
Additionally, because jails often house individuals who have never before been 
incarcerated, being in custody can have a traumatic effect on these inmates.113 
Experts call this experience the “shock of confinement,” which involves trauma 
that causes mental and emotional breakdown and leads to suicide.114 Another 
factor that frequently contributes to inmate suicide in jails is the experience of a 
crisis while in custody, such as severe guilt or shame over the charges that an 
inmate is facing, or an approaching court date.115 These experiences create se-
vere stress and anxiety, and consequently, result in suicidal behavior.116 
Often, jail inmates simply have trouble coping with the difficulties of con-
finement.117 Many of them are disconnected from friends and family, have trou-
ble getting along with corrections officers and fellow inmates, face legal hurdles, 
and experience physical and emotional breakdown.118 These stressful experienc-
es also contribute to an inmate’s suicidal ideation, attempt, and completion.119 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 1. 
 111 Id. Inmates experience various forms of stress, such as shock, fear, isolation, shame, and de-
humanization, which often times lead to suicidal ideation. Id. 
 112 Id. In 2000, Joseph Scott Rehrig committed suicide while incarcerated at the Wake County Jail in 
Raleigh, North Carolina for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a thirteen-year-old boy. NAT’L CTR. ON 
INSTS. & ALTS., JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE 1 (Summer 2007), http://www.ncianet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/sp_update_2007_summer.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FKX-2MHU] [hereinafter JAIL 
SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Summer 2007)]. Rehrig had no prior record, and when arrested and 
questioned by the police, he had appeared downcast and embarrassed, saying that he had never commit-
ted any crime like that before. Id. 
 113 See Chammah & Meagher, supra note 30 (explaining that one reason why jails have more 
suicides than prisons is that jail inmates are often facing incarceration for the first time and experience 
shock). 
 114 See id. (same); Martin Kaste, The ‘Shock of Confinement’: The Grim Reality of Suicide in Jail, 
NPR (July 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/27/426742309/the-shock-of-confinement-the-grim-
reality-of-suicide-in-jail [https://perma.cc/P5G6-WTMV] (describing the “shock of confinement” and 
the traumatic effect that first-time incarceration can have on individuals). 
 115 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 1. 
 116 See id. (explaining that the stress of confinement can lead an inmate to an emotional breaking 
point, which often precipitates suicide). In 2007, Charles Nixon, an inmate in the Southwick County 
Jail in Massachusetts committed suicide in his cell after being arrested for carrying a concealed weap-
on and menacing by stalking. JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Summer 2007), supra note 
112, at 6. Correctional staff had described him during his first few days in jail as anxious about his 
nearing court date and deeply concerned about the well-being of his wife and young son. Id. at 6–7. 
 117 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 1. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. 
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Although the rate of suicide in prisons is lower than it is in jails, it is still 
greater than the rate of suicide in the general non-incarcerated population, and is 
the second leading cause of death in state prisons, after various types of illness-
es.120 Although prison suicide victims face some of the same difficulties as jail 
suicide victims—such as loss of freedom and isolation—there are additional fac-
tors that contribute to suicidal behavior that are unique to prison inmates.121 For 
example, research suggests that more suicides occur in maximum and super-
maximum security prisons than medium or minimum-security prisons, because 
the maximum-security environment, which often involves single-cell or other 
types of punitive housing and limited opportunities for contact with the outside 
community, increases the likelihood of psychological distress and suicidal idea-
tion.122 Because inmates in maximum-security prisons are deprived of personal 
security, autonomy, and liberty, they are more prone to aggression, anxiety, de-
pression, and suicide.123 
As research demonstrates, various factors precipitate inmate suicide, and 
these factors relate to both an inmate’s own emotional and mental health, as well 
as an inmate’s experience while incarcerated.124 The consequences of these fac-
tors worsen when jails and prisons do not have adequate suicide prevention 
protocols to address inmate experiences that lead to suicide.125 Therefore, ef-
fective suicide prevention programs are necessary to ensure that inmates receive 
the resources they need to maintain their safety and health while incarcerated.126 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. at 2; MORTALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 2001–2014, supra note 33, at 4. The leading causes 
of death in prisons are various illnesses, including cancer, heart disease, liver disease, AIDS-related 
illnesses, and respiratory diseases. MORTALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 2001–2014, supra note 33, at 4. 
 121 See generally Meredith Huey Dye, Deprivation, Importation, and Prison Suicide: Combined 
Effects of Institutional Conditions and Inmate Composition, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 796 (2010), http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235210001194 [https://perma.cc/BA4J-4YMQ] (discussing 
the causes of suicide in prisons). Prison inmates, unlike jail inmates, are typically convicted of more 
serious crimes, have had prior experience with the criminal justice system, and serve longer sentences. 
Radley Balko, A Primer on Jailhouse Suicides, WASH. POST (July 17, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/07/17/a-primer-on-jailhouse-suicides/?utm_term=.23323ea9c449 
[https://perma.cc/H7MS-BBYR]; Kaste, supra note 114. 
 122 Dye, supra note 121, at 797–98, 803–04. 
 123 Id. at 797. 
 124 See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 1 (explaining that the jail environ-
ment and inmates’ experience of a crisis are the two main causes of jail suicide). 
 125 See id. at 54 (explaining the need for comprehensive suicide prevention services to address the 
needs of mentally ill inmates). 
 126 See id. (same); UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, PREVENTABLE TRAGEDIES: HOW TO REDUCE 
MENTAL HEALTH-RELATED DEATHS IN TEXAS JAILS 10 (Nov. 2016), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2016/11/2016-11-CVRC-Preventable-Tragedies.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4L9-
J5UG] (describing how jails in Texas have failed to adequately screen, house, observe, and treat men-
tally ill inmates, leading to inmate suicides). 
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B. Effective Suicide Prevention Programming 
Creating a comprehensive and effective inmate suicide prevention pro-
gram requires dedication and effort from every division and staff member in a 
correctional facility.127 The use of appropriate methods and strategies recom-
mended by experts in the correctional mental health field can provide support 
to troubled inmates and prevent inmate suicides.128 Unfortunately, the majority 
of prisons do not provide such programs for its inmates.129 
Agencies engaged in correctional research and policymaking agree that 
there are several critical components to an effective custodial suicide preven-
tion program.130 Staff training, intake and ongoing screenings, and supervision 
are just a few measures that jails and prisons should be taking to ensure that 
they have comprehensive suicide prevention policy programs in place.131 
These efforts can have far-reaching impacts in reducing inmate suicides, which 
in many instances are foreseeable and preventable.132 
Suicides usually take place in inmate housing units, during times when 
mental health staff is not monitoring the inmates.133 Therefore, correctional 
staff should receive suicide prevention training, and should clearly understand 
the mental history of their inmates, in order to prevent these incidents.134 The 
National Center on Institutions and Alternatives (“NCIA”) recommends that 
correctional staff who have regular contact with inmates receive eight hours of 
initial suicide prevention training and two hours of refresher training each 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS WITHIN JAILS 
AND PRISONS, NAT’L CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTS. 3 (revised July 2017), https://www.ncchc.org/filebin/
Resources/Suicide-Prevention-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TEE-5Z5H] (advocating for a multidisci-
plinary approach to inmate suicide prevention). 
 128 See generally id. (outlining several critical components of an effective inmate suicide preven-
tion strategy). 
 129 See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 41 (noting that although the majori-
ty of facilities surveyed in the study had written suicide prevention protocols, most of these policies 
failed to incorporate the critical components of an effective suicide prevention strategy). 
 130 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 127, 
at 1–5; Hayes, supra note 11, at 189–93; NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 33–41; 
PREVENTABLE TRAGEDIES, supra note 126, at 47–53; RAND CORP. PRIORITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
NEEDS INITIATIVE, CARING FOR THOSE IN CUSTODY: IDENTIFYING HIGH-PRIORITY NEEDS TO REDUCE 
MORTALITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 9–12 (2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1900/RR1967/RAND_RR1967.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VNW-GNFM]. 
 131 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 132 Id. 
 133 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 34–35. For example, Charles Nixon, 
who was an inmate in the Southwick County Jail in Massachusetts, was found hanging from a bed 
sheet in his cell at least forty-five minutes after he was last observed by correctional staff. JAIL SUI-
CIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Summer 2007), supra note 112, at 6. According to one of the jail’s 
officers, Nixon was not placed on suicide watch because he had received psychiatric treatment at a 
local hospital for suicidal ideation several days earlier, and was released by the hospital. Id. at 7. 
 134 GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 127, at 1. 
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year.135 All training should be meaningful and aimed at reducing suicides.136 
Trainings should also incorporate timely and reliable information that address-
es current problems, rather than simply achieve the bare minimum in order to 
comply with an accreditation standard.137 Because suicide prevention requires 
collaboration between correctional officers and mental health professionals, 
training should be conducted in a live, interactive setting, rather than through 
video or webinar.138 
Intake screening and ongoing assessments are also critical to an effective 
suicide prevention program.139 Because inmates can become suicidal at any 
point during their sentence, and often experience their first episode of mental 
illness after incarceration, screening should be a continuous process.140 Further-
more, research shows that approximately two-thirds of all suicide victims com-
municate their intent some time before death.141 Therefore, inmate evaluations 
should be ongoing and include a variety of inquiries, including any history of 
suicidal thoughts or attempts, current plans of suicide, prior mental health treat-
ment, suicide risk during prior confinement, and opinions of the arresting or 
transporting officers that the inmate is suicidal.142 Finally, the determination that 
an inmate is no longer suicidal and can be released from suicide precautions 
must only be made by a qualified mental health professional (“QMHP”)—a li-
censed, masters-level or above clinician—after a comprehensive risk assess-
ment.143 
Proper levels of observation and management can also reduce the likeli-
hood of suicide.144 Mental health professionals recommend two levels of su-
pervision for inmates.145 The first is close observation of an inmate who is not 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Id. The National Center on Institutions and Alternatives is a non-profit organization that con-
ducts research and training on jail suicide, and provides materials and resources to assist correctional 
professionals and their facilities. NAT’L CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTS., PROGRAMS AND SERVICES (2015), 
http://www.ncianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/About-NCIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL62-9H76]. 
 136 Hayes, supra note 11, at 190. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 189–90. 
 140 Id. When it comes to screening, it is important to note that staff should not rely solely an in-
mate’s statements during a screening, even if they deny suicidal thoughts, because there are various 
reasons why an inmate would not want to disclose their intention to commit suicide, such as not want-
ing correctional staff to prevent him or her from actually committing the suicide. Id. at 189. Correc-
tional staff should also pay close attention to the inmate’s behavior, actions, and/or behavioral history. 
Id. at 190. 
 141 GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 127, at 1. 
 142 Id. at 2; Hayes, supra note 11, at 189–90. 
 143 Hayes, supra note 11, at 191. According to national standards, a QMHP would include a psy-
chiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric social worker, psychiatric nurse, and others who have the legally 
required education, credentials, and experience permitting them to evaluate and care for the mental 
health needs of patients. Id. 
 144 GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 127, at 4. 
 145 Id. 
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actually suicidal, but who has expressed suicidal thoughts, has a recent prior 
history of self-harm, or behaves in ways that demonstrate a potential for sui-
cide.146 Inmates under this level of supervision should be housed in protrusion-
free cells and observed at staggered intervals every ten minutes or less.147 The 
second level of supervision is constant observation, intended for inmates who 
are actively suicidal—those threatening or engaging in suicidal behavior.148 
Correctional staff should observe such inmates continuously.149 In addition to 
observing suicidal inmates, mental health staff should also assess and interact 
with such inmates on a daily basis.150 Finally, inmates on suicide watch should 
have individual treatment plans developed by mental health staff in conjunc-
tion with correctional personnel.151 These plans should discuss the signs, 
symptoms, and circumstances that often lead to suicidal behavior, advise on 
how to help inmates overcome suicidal thoughts, and suggest actions that the 
inmate and correctional staff can take if suicidal ideation reoccurs.152 
C. The Current State of Suicide Prevention Programming 
Despite consensus among researchers about the need for comprehensive 
suicide prevention programming in prisons and jails, the vast majority of cur-
rent custodial suicide monitoring and prevention policies are not adequate in 
preventing inmate suicide.153 According to a 2005–2006 national study of jail 
suicide, only 7.5% of suicide victims in the facilities participating in the study 
were on suicide precautions when they committed suicide.154 Although the 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. A protrusion is an anchoring device that inmates use to hang from in order to commit sui-
cide. See id. (describing different types of protrusions and devices for hanging). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. Between 1985 and 1987, New York State developed the “Crisis Service Model,” which 
was “a multifaceted initiative designed to facilitate the identification, referral and treatment of inmates 
who were suicidal and/or seriously mentally ill.” NAT’L CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTS., JAIL SUICIDE/
MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE 2 (Summer 2005), http://www.ncianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/
sp_update_2005_summer.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4TL-JK9B] [hereinafter JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL 
HEALTH UPDATE (Summer 2005)]. Specifically, the Crisis Service Model brought local jails and 
mental health programs into partnership to address the needs of mentally ill and suicidal inmates. Id. 
In 1984, before the Crisis Service Model was implemented, there were thirty-two inmate suicides 
among all of New York State’s county and police department jails. Id. at 4. In 2004, that number 
dropped to fifteen inmate suicides. Id. 
 153 See Hanson, supra note 36, at 8; Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 154 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 27. Note that the percentage is for both 
holding facilities (where inmates are detained for seventy-two hours or less) and detention facilities 
(where inmates are detained for over seventy-two hours). Id. From 2005 to2006, there were a total of 
564 reported jail suicides. See MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000–2014, supra note 30, at 5. It ap-
pears that the failure to identify and adequately supervise suicidal inmates continues to be a problem. 
See Jesse Bogan, Man Hung in Cell for Hours at St. Louis Lockup While Guards Streamed Netflix, ST. 
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same study showed that approximately 77% of the facilities had implemented 
an intake screening process to evaluate suicide risk in inmates, only 27.4% 
verified whether an inmate had ever been on suicide precautions during any 
prior confinement in the same facility.155 Additionally, only about 31% of facil-
ities surveyed arresting and/or transporting officers on their concerns about the 
mental health of newly admitted inmates.156 
In addition to employing qualified and competent mental health profes-
sionals, preventing inmate suicide also requires adequate training for correc-
tional staff.157 Roughly 62% of the respondents in the 2005–2006 study dis-
closed that they provided suicide prevention training to at least 90% of their 
correctional staff.158 Of the respondents who reported having suicide training, 
however, 75% conducted trainings only once a year, whereas the remaining 
25% coordinated trainings biennially or on a pre-service basis.159 The majority 
(69%) of reported suicide-prevention trainings offered by the facilities in the 
study were two hours or less in length; only 6% of the training programs were 
eight-hours long.160 
Safe housing is another important aspect of inmate suicide prevention.161 
Because hanging is the most common method of inmate suicide—roughly 
93%, according to the study mentioned above—correctional facilities with ad-
equate suicide prevention measures should ensure that the cells of suicidal in-
mates do not contain obvious protrusions and are located close to correctional 
                                                                                                                           
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/man-
hung-in-cell-for-hours-at-st-louis-lockup/article_198d0a9c-21f1-545a-b08e-622929aed169.html 
[https://perma.cc/KG2H-83ZW] (detailing the circumstances surrounding the death of David Garceau, 
a former inmate at the St. Louis Community Release Center who, despite having issues with mental 
health and drug abuse, was placed in a segregated unit and hung himself and laid dead in his cell for 
ten hours while guards on duty watched television and browsed the internet); Dan Kane & David 
Raynor, 51 NC Jail Inmates Have Died in Past Five Years After Poor Supervision from Jailers, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (updated Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/crime/article
164829912.html [https://perma.cc/FMM3-UDNM] (describing the events leading up to the death of 
Emily Jean Call, a former inmate in North Carolina’s Wilkes County Jail who had cut her wrists two 
weeks before her death and expressed to detention officers that she was depressed wanted to kill her-
self, but nonetheless went unwatched for more than an hour and eventually hung herself in a bathroom 
in a common area of the facility). 
 155 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 33. 
 156 Id. at 34. 
 157 Hayes, supra note 11, at 190. 
 158 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 35. 
 159 Id. In one instance, a booking officer confessed that he did not receive any training on how to 
conduct a proper intake screening or what questions to ask a newly admitted inmate. Hayes, supra 
note 11, at 190–91. 
 160 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 35. 
 161 See id. at 38 (explaining the importance of safe housing in jails, given the prevalence of in-
mate suicides due to hanging). 
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personnel.162 As of 2005–2006, however, only 32% of facilities from the earli-
er-mentioned study reported having policies that involved assigning suicidal 
inmates to safe, suicide-resistant, and protrusion-free cells.163 
In addition, the NCIA and the National Institute of Corrections (“NIC”) 
recommend that every suicide and suicide attempt requiring hospitalization be 
examined through a morbidity-mortality review process in order to determine 
if the incident was preventable.164 The review should include all relevant in-
formation, including the circumstances surrounding the incident, the victim’s 
medical or mental health information, factors that contributed to the suicide, 
and recommendations for policy, procedural, or other changes.165 A 2005–2006 
report on inmate suicide demonstrated however, that the majority—63%—of 
respondents in the study stated that they did not conduct a mortality-morbidity 
review after an inmate suicide.166 Those who did conduct reviews either did 
not mention any precipitating factors, or pointed to triggers such as a recent 
conviction or sentence, loss of a loved one, fear of being transferred to a long-
term prison, or lack of visits from family members as causes for the sui-
cides.167 
According to the NIC, although 85% of holding and detention facilities in 
its report had suicide prevention policies in writing, only 20% of those written 
policies encompassed all of the components of an effective suicide prevention 
program.168 These facts and statistics reveal the deficiencies in suicide preven-
tion that permeate correctional facilities throughout the United States.169 These 
deficiencies explain why the rate of suicide in jails and prisons is increasing, 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Id. at 38, 44. In 2015, former Texas inmate Sandra Bland committed suicide by hanging her-
self from the bathroom privacy partition of her cell, using a plastic garbage bag provided by the facili-
ty—a common method of inmate suicide. Debbie Nathan, What Happened to Sandra Bland?, NATION 
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/what-happened-to-sandra-bland/ [https://perma.cc/
SW9U-X8Q9]. 
 163 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 38–39. 
 164 Id. at 39. The morbidity-mortality review process is separate from formal investigations to 
determine the cause of death of inmates. Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. In 2015, Guy Duffy, a former inmate at the Essex County Jail in Massachusetts, hung him-
self in his cell just barely two weeks into his thirty-day sentence for an animal cruelty charge. Jenifer 
McKim & Shaz Sajadi, ‘They Left Him Everything to Hang Himself,’ BOS. GLOBE (May 6, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/05/06/they-left-him-everything-hang-himself/KVbjAop
CsOsPVZ3y2StGSN/story.html [https://perma.cc/VBU5-SLUY]. The facility’s mortality review of 
Duffy’s death concluded that staff “responded appropriately” in his case, but failed to explain why 
Duffy was placed in a segregation unit despite the fact that he exhibited “mental health issues.” Id. 
 168 NATIONAL STUDY ON JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 41. Additionally, although 93% of par-
ticipants in the NIC study reported having suicide-watch protocols, only 2% provided constant obser-
vation as an option. Id. at 37. 
 169 See id. at 37–41 (presenting data on correctional facilities’ implementation of various suicide 
prevention strategies, and finding that these statistics show an overall lack of comprehensive inmate 
suicide prevention programming). 
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and why further suicide prevention reform by correctional facilities is re-
quired.170 As one psychologist and suicide expert said, “The style [of suicide] 
can be readily seen, and there are steps we can take to stop suicide, if we know 
where to look.”171 Correctional leaders must enhance their efforts to reduce 
inmate suicides, which are preventable if the appropriate methods and strate-
gies are implemented.172 
D. Why Correctional Facilities Are Falling Short in  
Preventing Inmate Suicide 
There are several explanations for the inadequate suicide prevention pro-
gramming in today’s correctional facilities.173 First, facilities struggle to pre-
vent the suicide of an inmate who is difficult to recognize as being at risk for 
self-harm.174 Although certain suicide prevention measures have become popu-
lar in facilities throughout the country, these measures only focus on inmates 
who have already been determined as suicidal risks.175 Identifying suicidal in-
mates on an ongoing basis is important because an increasing number of sui-
cides among inmates are “clean” suicides—suicides among prisoners with no 
prior psychiatric history.176 Current suicide prevention efforts focus only on 
identifying and preventing deaths of inmates with known mental illnesses, but 
many inmates experience their first mental health crisis only after incarcera-
tion.177 Therefore, these suicide prevention efforts fail to recognize inmates 
who develop suicidal ideations after they have been incarcerated.178 
Another obstacle to effective inmate suicide prevention is correction offi-
cials’ negative attitudes toward prevention.179 Statements like, “[i]f someone 
really wants to kill themselves there’s generally nothing you can do about it” 
and “[w]e did everything we could to prevent this death, but he showed no 
signs of suicidal behavior” are often made following an inmate suicide, and 
before any meaningful attempt to understand the incident.180 As one jail com-
                                                                                                                           
 170 See id. (same). 
 171 Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 172 See id. (stating that progress in correctional suicide prevention is still attainable if the right 
strategies are implemented). 
 173 See infra notes 174–191 and accompanying text (explaining several key reasons for the lack of 
comprehensive suicide prevention programming in facilities). 
 174 Hayes, supra note 11, at 189. These are inmates that deny being suicidal, and may even sign 
contracts with their facilities’ medical staff saying that they will not engage in self harm in order to be 
released from suicide precautions, but whose actions and history show otherwise. Id. 
 175 Id. Examples of these popular measures include the use of “suicide-resistant” cells, closed-
circuit television for inmate supervision, and inmate companions. Id. 
 176 Hanson, supra note 36, at 7–8. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 180 Id. 
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mander stated, “[w]hen you begin to use excuses to justify a bad outcome, 
whether it be low staffing levels, inadequate funding, physical plant concerns, 
etc., issues we struggle with each day, you lack the philosophy that even one 
death is not acceptable.” The commander added that if facilities tolerate even 
just a few deaths, then they have “already lost the battle.”181 
Additionally, many facilities across the United States have not yet em-
braced the goal of preventing inmate suicides.182 For example, one jail facility 
implemented a fee-for-service program for health care services, including a 
ten-dollar charge for inmates to request release from suicide watch.183 In an-
other example, a nurse asked an inmate during an intake screening if he was 
suicidal, and when the inmate answered in the affirmative, the nurse replied, 
“[i]f you tell me you’re suicidal, we’re going to have to strip you of all your 
clothes and house you in a bare cell.” 184 The inmate then replied that he was 
not suicidal.185 Negative attitudes have contributed to the idea that deaths in 
prison are inevitable, and have thus prevented correctional facilities from de-
veloping meaningful suicide prevention efforts.186 
Finally, the increasing costs of mental health care also contribute to inad-
equate inmate suicide prevention measures.187 For example, in 2007, jails in 
Broward County, Florida spent $130 a day on an inmate with mental illness, as 
opposed to just $80 on an inmate with no mental illness.188 In 2003, Texas 
prisons spent between $30,000 and $50,000 annually on each of its mentally ill 
inmates, as compared to about $22,000 annually on non-mentally ill in-
mates.189 In 2002, the Ohio Clark County Jail spent more on psychiatric medi-
                                                                                                                           
 181 Id. 
 182 See id. at 189 (explaining that providing services to mentally ill inmates is often not a priority 
for correctional leaders, and that the focus of inmate suicide prevention is often on implementing 
“quick fixes,” rather than on the more important goals of identifying and treating suicidal inmates). 
 183 Id. at 193. The fee for being released from suicide watch was later eliminated, after the jail 
was investigated by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justices. Id. Still, inmates are 
often charged fees for various aspects of life in confinement, including medical visits, phone calls, and 
work release programs. Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register 
Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1501–02 (2016). 
 184 Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 See Hanson, supra note 36, at 7. In particular, funding is necessary in order to attract and re-
tain mental health staff in correctional facilities, and purchase technology and equipment that will 
facilitate suicide prevention measures. See CARING FOR THOSE IN CUSTODY, supra note 130, at 12 
(explaining the importance of funding to attract and retain mental health personnel in jails, as well as 
the growing need for technology and equipment to reduce inmate suicides). 
 188 TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., HOW MANY INDIVIDUALS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS ARE 
IN JAILS AND PRISONS? (Nov. 2014), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/
backgrounders/how%20many%20individuals%20with%20serious%20mental%20illness%20are%20
in%20jails%20and%20prisons%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WFW4-V2PJ]. 
 189 Id. 
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cation than on food for inmates.190 Given the costliness of mental health care 
in jails and prisons, states have little incentive to invest in mental health and 
suicide prevention efforts.191 
There is a severe lack of effective and comprehensive suicide prevention 
programming across the United States; as a result, suicide has become a lead-
ing cause of death among inmates.192 Families of inmates struggle against cur-
rent case law to hold correctional facilities liable for inmate suicide deaths, and 
thus, correctional facilities have little incentive to implement change.193 There-
fore, in order to protect suicidal inmates, it is vital that the federal government 
incentivize adequate suicide prevention in correctional facilities.194 
III. ENDING THE INMATE SUICIDE CRISIS 
Suicide is one of the leading causes of death for inmates across the United 
States; these deaths however, are preventable.195 Comprehensive suicide pre-
vention programs can be effective in eliminating, or at least significantly re-
ducing, inmate suicides.196 Unfortunately, the majority of prisons and jails do 
not employ effective suicide prevention programs.197 Because correctional of-
ficers are currently protected from liability for inmate suicide under the doc-
trine of qualified immunity, the need for effective suicide prevention pro-
gramming is even more crucial; inmates and their families have no viable op-
tions for justice when such programs fail.198 As such, the federal government 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. 
 191 See id. In Worcester, Massachusetts, correctional officials have attempted to implement new 
suicide prevention measures, but struggled with a lack of funding. McKim & Sajadi, supra note 167. 
According to the superintendent of the Worcester County Jail and House of Correction, the facility’s 
$45 million budget is not even enough to pay for basic costs, let alone to improve mental health ser-
vices. Id. 
 192 See supra notes 153–172 and accompanying text (outlining the current state of suicide preven-
tion programming across the states). 
 193 See Dorf, supra note 17 (explaining how the Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor v. Barkes 
prevents families of inmate suicide victims from seeking retribution). 
 194 See infra notes 195–261 and accompanying text. 
 195 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 193 (explaining that inmate suicides are preventable if the correct 
prevention measures are implemented); MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000–2014, supra note 30, at 5 
(showing that suicide was the leading cause of death in local jails between 2000–2014, when consider-
ing all the illnesses as separate causes of death); MORTALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 2001–2014, supra 
note 33, at 4 (showing that suicide was a leading cause of death in state prisons between 2000–2014). 
 196 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 188–89 (explaining that inmate suicide can be further reduced 
with the appropriate practices). 
 197 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at vii. 
 198 See Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (holding that qualified immunity applied 
to correctional officers despite the fact that their failure to implement adequate suicide prevention 
measures may have caused the death of a suicidal inmate); Dorf, supra note 17 (explaining that fami-
lies of inmate suicide victims have limited means to achieve justice because of the holding in Taylor 
v. Barkes). 
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must intervene to ensure protection for suicidal inmates.199 Specifically, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) should revise its Justice Assistance Grant 
(“JAG”) Program to condition state and local government correctional funding 
on the implementation of comprehensive suicide prevention programs in their 
prisons and jails.200 The DOJ should also list inmate suicide prevention as an 
area of emphasis on its JAG application form, to encourage jurisdictions to 
invest more resources in preventing correctional suicide.201 Finally, the DOJ 
should establish discretionary grant opportunities through which state and local 
agencies can apply for additional funding to support their inmate suicide pre-
vention programs, and encourage their implementation and enforcement.202 
A. Elements of a Comprehensive Suicide Prevention Program 
Although there is no single formula for an effective inmate suicide pre-
vention program, correctional mental health experts recommend certain proto-
cols that should be implemented in jails and prisons in order to prevent inmate 
suicides.203 These protocols should be dictated on paper and enforced in prac-
tice.204 At a minimum, state and local correctional facilities should implement 
the suicide prevention strategies that are in place at the Orange County Sher-
iff’s Department (“OCSD”), as such policies have effectively reduced the 
prevalence of inmate suicides.205 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See infra notes 231–261 and accompanying text. This section will focus on the reform of state 
prisons and local jails, and not federal prisons, as there are significantly fewer inmates in the latter (in 
2014, there were approximately 1,264,300 inmates in state prison and 750,100 in local jails, but only 
169,500 in federal prisons). See MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS, 2000–2014, supra note 30, at 25; MOR-
TALITY IN STATE PRISONS, 2001–2014, supra note 33, at 18. Also, note that in forty-four states, jails are 
operated by the local government, and in six states, jails and prisons are jointly operated by the state 
government. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MANAGING CORRECTIONS COSTS 8 (Feb. 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/managingcorrectionscosts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UST-6SSR]. 
 200 See infra notes 231–244 and accompanying text. 
 201 See infra notes 245–249 and accompanying text. The 2017 JAG state application form con-
tained a list of “BJA Areas of Emphasis”—areas of justice reform in which state and local govern-
ments applying for the JAG Program were encouraged to invest with their funding awards. BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE 
GRANT PROGRAM FY 2017 STATE SOLICITATION 10–11 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/Funding/JAG
State17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7C3-L86R] [hereinafter JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION]. 
 202 See supra notes 250–261 and accompanying text. A discretionary grant is awarded by the 
Department of Justice to a state or local agency in order for that agency to implement a specific type 
of justice-related program. OJP Grant Process, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Mar. 11, 2018), https://ojp.
gov/funding/Apply/GrantProcess.htm [https://perma.cc/3M25-3WE4]. 
 203 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 204 See NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 40–41 (explaining the importance of 
written suicide prevention protocols, but also questioning the quality of those protocols in today’s 
correctional facilities). 
 205 See NAT’L CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTS., JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE 1–6 (Fall 2005), 
http://www.ncianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/sp_update_2005_fall.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPL6-
QZ7E] [hereinafter JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005)] (highlighting news from 
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One important element of the OCSD inmate suicide prevention program 
that all correctional facilities must implement into their own programs involves 
the process of intake screenings.206 Intake screenings at facilities should be 
detailed—with comprehensive questions regarding an inmate’s prior mental 
health and medical treatment, and questions to elicit indications of emotional 
stability—in order to reveal an inmate’s suicide risk and/or other mental health 
issues.207 Effective screenings require that a qualified mental health profes-
sional (“QMHP”)—a licensed, masters-level or above clinician such as a psy-
chiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric social worker, or psychiatric nurse—be re-
sponsible for conducting such screenings.208 Additionally, correctional facili-
ties should adopt the OCSD’s strategy, which requires mental health staff to 
place at-risk inmates under suicide precautions that are tailored to the inmates’ 
                                                                                                                           
around the country about jail suicide rates and new initiatives taken by facilities to improve suicide 
prevention measures). The Orange County Sheriff’s Department (“OCSD”) administers five jail facili-
ties in Orange County, California, and is the eleventh largest jail system in the United States and the 
second largest system in California. Id. at 1. As of August 2005, the Orange County jail system had an 
average population of over 6,500 inmates. Id. Between 1995 and 2004, the OCSD jail system had over 
660,000 admissions, but only four inmate suicides. Id. During this period, the suicide rate among all 
five OCSD facilities was only 7.7 deaths per 100,000 inmates. Id. At the time of the report, the OCSD 
system had the lowest inmate suicide rate across the largest county jails in California, and a rate far 
lower than the average across jails within the state. Id. Its success in preventing inmate suicides is 
attributable to the approach implemented by its prior Assistant Sheriff for Jail Operations, John 
“Rocky” Hewitt, and his successor, Kim Markuson, who replaced Hewitt in 2003. Id. at 2. Hewitt and 
Markuson made it a priority to prevent jail suicides and ensure that the jail staff was serious about 
their jobs and the mental health of the inmates. Id. Markuson continued Hewitt’s legacy, making sure 
that there was a clear expectation within the department that everyone was responsible for preventing 
jail suicides, and encouraging close relationships between correction officers and the medical and 
mental health staff. Id. 
 206 See id. at 2 (describing the intake process at the OCSD, which includes a basic suicide risk 
inquiry, a review of the inmate’s mental health history, the ability to refer an inmate to a mental health 
staff member who is stationed in the intake area); Hayes, supra note 11, at 193. 
 207 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 
127, at 2 (providing a list of intake screening questions). Specifically, the National Center for Institu-
tions and Alternatives recommends the following questions, which may be included in the routine 
medical screening form, or in a separate form:  
Was the inmate a medical, mental health, or suicide risk during any prior contact or 
confinement in this facility? Does the arresting or transporting officer have any infor-
mation (e.g., from observed behavior, documentation from sending agency or facility, 
conversation with family member) that indicates the inmate is a medical, mental health, 
or suicide risk now? Has the inmate ever attempted suicide? Has the inmate ever con-
sidered suicide? Is the inmate now being treated or has he/she ever been treated for 
mental health or emotional problems? Has the inmate recently experienced a significant 
loss (e.g., relationship, death of family member or close friend, job)? Has a family 
member or close friend of the inmate ever attempted or committed suicide? Does the 
inmate feel there is nothing to look forward to in the immediate future (expressing help-
lessness or hopelessness)? Is the inmate thinking of hurting or killing himself/herself? 
Id. 
 208 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 191 (explaining the importance of QMHPs in the intake process). 
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individual needs.209 In particular, mental health staff should monitor inmates 
placed on suicide precautions according to their level of suicide risk, and 
should house such inmates in suicide-resistant cells that are located near men-
tal, medical, or other staff—for example, high-risk inmates should receive 
around the clock monitoring by trained medical staff, whereas low-risk in-
mates should receive only periodical monitoring that is staggered in ten minute 
intervals.210 A QMHP should also be responsible for authorizing the removal of 
inmates from suicide precautions, and ensuring that inmates who are released 
from suicide precautions are reassessed periodically throughout their confine-
ment, to address any recurring suicidal ideations.211 
Perhaps one of the biggest reasons for the OCSD’s success in inmate sui-
cide prevention is that its correctional officers receive extensive suicide pre-
vention training.212 Thus, new correctional staff at jails and prisons should be 
required to attend at least two hours of suicide prevention training before they 
begin their employment, as well as an advanced training during their first year 
on duty that is at least four hours long.213 All current and new correctional of-
ficers and correctional mental health personnel should also receive quarterly 
in-service suicide prevention training, and veteran sheriffs should undergo 
                                                                                                                           
 209 JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005), supra note 205, at 2. Inmates placed on 
suicide precautions receive supervision from both correctional officers and nursing staff at staggered 
thirty-minute intervals, thereby ensuring that each inmate is seen by either an officer or nurse every 
fifteen minutes. Id. at 3. Other precautions include requiring the inmate to wear a safety gown, or 
housing the inmate in a safety cell. Id. at 2. Once an inmate’s level of suicide risk has returned to a 
safely manageable level and the inmate is transferred out of a mental health unit, the OCSD inmate 
continues to receive mental health services according to clinical recommendations. Id. at 3. 
 210 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 
127, at 3–4. Suicidal inmates should be housed in cells that are free of protrusions, such as those from 
clothing hooks, towel racks, or certain light fixtures. Id. at 3. The cell doors of suicidal inmates should 
contain clear panels, allowing for unobstructed observation of the inmate. Id. Some facilities use 
heavy gauge Lexan clear panels. Id. 
 211 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 189–90. In one local jail facility, mental health professionals 
briefly screen inmates with a history of mental illness or suicide risk after they attend a court hearing, 
as many suicides occur close to a court hearing. Id. In other jurisdictions, inmates arrested for murder, 
domestic violence, child molestation, or highly publicized cases require additional layers of assess-
ment. Id. 
 212 See JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005), supra note 205, at 4 (explaining the 
types of training offered to OCSD correctional staff). 
 213 See id. (explaining that OCSD correctional staff receive two hours of suicide prevention train-
ing before the start of employment and four hours of advanced training during the first year on the 
job). Walking around and interacting with inmates is key to reducing the chance of an incident, in-
cluding a suicide attempt. Id. at 3–4. Therefore, the OCSD encourages correctional officers to main-
tain continuous movement in the housing areas, and dialogue with inmates in their housing units. Id. 
at 3. In addition, all correctional staff are required to carry a pocket-sized laminated card containing 
potential high-risk warning signs for suicidal behavior. Id. at 4. The cards are not only informational 
but are also symbolic, and reinforce the administration’s message that suicides will not be tolerated. 
Id. 
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supplemental training at least once a year.214 Such training should be conduct-
ed in-person in an interactive environment, and at a minimum, educate correc-
tional staff on appropriate screening methods, identifying warning signs of sui-
cidal ideation, and emergency response strategies.215 
Another key component of the OCSD’s suicide prevention program is the 
multidisciplinary team approach, where correctional, medical, and mental 
health staff all work together to address the medical needs of inmates.216 Cor-
rectional facilities must therefore also cultivate collaboration and teamwork, 
by requiring representatives of the three disciplines to meet regularly to discuss 
cases requiring immediate attention, as well as ongoing systemic issues.217 As 
with the OCSD, correctional facilities should develop a system of checks and 
balances to ensure that each department within a facility is doing its part to 
prevent inmate suicides.218 At the OCSD, the suicide prevention process begins 
when an arresting officer alerts booking personnel of a potentially at-risk in-
mate, or when a medical professional identifies a problem with an inmate dur-
ing an intake.219 The process continues when correctional staff in the housing 
units refer potentially suicidal inmates to mental health staff members, who 
then perform suicide risk assessments on the inmates.220 There is an under-
standing among all the OCSD staff that although everyone in a given facility 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See id. at 4 (explaining that OCSD correctional staff receive quarterly in-service training on 
suicide prevention and that more experienced staff members also receive refresher training at least 
once a year). At the OCSD, these supplemental trainings often occur before the holidays, when in-
mates experience increased feelings of despondency or anger, and are more prone to suicidal behavior. 
Id. Following these trainings, deputies make referrals to mental health staff more often. Id. 
 215 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 
127, at 1; Hayes, supra note 11, at 190. 
 216 See JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005), supra note 205, at 5. The Orange 
County Adult Correctional Health Services, which provides mental health services at the OCSD’s five 
correctional facilities, states the following on its website:  
Adult Correctional Health Services (ACHS) provides a wide range of psychiatric and 
crisis intervention services to the inmates in the Orange County Jail System: Evalua-
tion/assessment of all inmates referred during the triage process; Crisis intervention to 
ameliorate symptoms of psychiatric/psychological decompensation; Medication evalua-
tion and prescription of psychotropic medication where indicated; Collateral contacts 
with Sheriff’s Department, Criminal Justice System, Mental Health professionals, fami-
lies, and friends for the purpose of effective continuing care during incarceration; 
Group Therapy; Care coordination services for linkage, referral to community mental 
health services and discharge planning for post custody treatment service; Coordination 
with Long Term Care for psychiatric hospitalization as appropriate . . . . 
Adult Correctional Health Services—What We Do, ORANGE COUNTY HEALTH CARE AGENCY (Mar. 
10, 2018), http://www.ochealthinfo.com/about/chs/achs [https://perma.cc/FFD9-5Z8J]. 
 217 See JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005), supra note 205, at 5 (describing the 
OCSD’s practice of holding weekly meetings between correctional staff from different disciplines). 
 218 See id. (describing the OCSD’s effective system of checks and balances). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
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has separate duties and functions, the responsibility for preventing suicides is 
shared, and it takes a team to prevent inmate deaths; this dedication to inmate 
suicide prevention must be fostered in all correctional facilities.221 
Finally, the OCSD takes seriously each inmate death that occurs, and re-
vises its policies and procedures to address the causes of inmate deaths.222 
Similarly, correctional facilities should submit every completed inmate suicide 
or suicide attempt to morbidity-mortality review.223 An outside agency should 
conduct the review in order for the process to be handled in a neutral man-
ner.224 The review should also “include a critical inquiry of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, procedures relevant to the incident, all relevant train-
ing that involved staff received, pertinent medical and mental health services 
or reports involving the victim, precipitating factors that may have led to the 
suicide.”225 Finally, it is important for the reviewing agency to explore poten-
tial recommendations for policy, operational, or other changes to reduce the 
likelihood of another inmate suicide.226 
Together, the policies and procedures described above constitute a com-
prehensive suicide prevention strategy that will be effective in reducing the 
number of inmate suicides in both state and local correctional facilities.227 In-
mate suicides are demonstrably preventable, but such prevention requires an 
intentional effort on the part of correctional leaders, correctional medical staff, 
and even government leaders.228 Correctional systems modeled after the 
OCSD, in which a comprehensive range of suicide prevention strategies are 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See id. (describing the OCSD staff’s sense of responsibility for inmate deaths). 
 222 See id. at 6 (describing the OCSD’s administrative review process following a critical inci-
dent). Following each of the four inmate suicides that occurred in OCSD facilities between 1990 and 
1996, the OCSD conducted an administrative review that included recommendations “for change in 
policy, training, physical plant, medical or mental health services, and operational procedures.” Id. For 
example, in February 1990, an inmate in the OCSD’s Central Women’s Jail chose to remain alone in 
her dormitory unit while other inmates went to dinner, and during that time, she hung herself from a 
fixed metal rod in the shower area. Id. Following the incident, the OCSD replaced all fixed shower 
rods with breakaway rods, and revised its policies to prohibit any inmate from remaining alone in a 
dormitory unit. Id. 
 223 See id. (describing the OCSD’s administrative review process following a critical incident); 
GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 127, at 5 (stat-
ing the importance of a morbidity-mortality review process); NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, 
supra note 30, at 39 (stating the importance of a morbidity-mortality review process). 
 224 See GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS, supra note 
127, at 5 (stating the importance of a morbidity-mortality review process). 
 225 NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE, supra note 30, at 39. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See supra notes 203–226 and accompanying text. 
 228 See Hayes, supra note 11, at 193 (explaining that inmate suicides are preventable); supra notes 
203–226 and accompanying text (describing the key elements of an effective suicide prevention pro-
gram and the need for involvement by both correctional and mental health staff); infra notes 231–261 
and accompanying text (suggesting that the federal government can help reduce inmate suicides by 
improving their criminal justice funding programs). 
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implemented, are likely to have greater success in reducing inmate suicides.229 
In order to incentivize state and local correctional facilities to implement the 
above-discussed inmate suicide prevention strategies, the federal government 
should revise its primary grant program for state and local criminal justice op-
erations—JAG—to condition such grant funding on the implementation of 
comprehensive suicide prevention programs, and provide additional discre-
tionary grants for correctional suicide prevention purposes.230 
B. Incentivizing Inmate Suicide Prevention Reform by Modifying the 
Federal Justice Assistance Grant Program Requirements and Forms 
The Edward Byrne Memorial JAG Program, administered by the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance (“BJA”), is the primary source of federal funding for state 
and local criminal justice initiatives.231 JAG funds may be used to provide re-
sources, such as training or equipment, for any of the following criminal jus-
tice purposes: (i) law enforcement; (ii) prosecution and court; (iii) prevention 
and education; (iv) corrections and community corrections; (v) drug treatment 
and enforcement; (vi) planning, evaluation, and technology improvement; (vii) 
crime victim and witnesses; and (viii) mental health programs.232 Any state or 
local government that meets the JAG eligibility requirements may submit an 
application for JAG funds, which must include a description of the program to 
which the funds will be allocated, and a budgeting worksheet detailing how the 
JAG funds will be used to implement the program.233 The award process starts 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See JAIL SUICIDE/MENTAL HEALTH UPDATE (Fall 2005), supra note 205, at 1–6 (describing 
the OCSD’s suicide prevention programming). 
 230 See infra notes 231–261 and accompanying text. 
 231 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT PRO-
GRAM ACTIVITY REPORT 1 (2016), https://www.bja.gov/programs/JAG-Activity-Report-Sept-2016_
508.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJ9E-5Z4B] [hereinafter JAG ACTIVITY REPORT]. The program is author-
ized by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3751 (2012); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (Aug. 2017), https://www.bja.gov/Funding/JAGFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SGE5-WKFA] [hereinafter JAG FAQ]. In 2016, approximately $275 million of JAG funds were 
awarded to various states and U.S. territories. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/jagp16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MJ5-VBQE] [hereinafter JAG TECHNICAL REPORT]. 
Of that amount, approximately $181 million went to state governments, $86 million went to local 
governments, and $7 million went to U.S. territories and the District of Columbia. Id. The BJA is a 
component of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs. About the Bureau of Jus-
tice Assistance, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2018), https://
www.bja.gov/About/index.html [https://perma.cc/68LS-S3HX]. 
 232 JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 5. 
 233 Id. at 16. All fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa are eligible to apply for 
JAG State awards. JAG FAQ, supra note 231, at 1. JAG Local awards are available to local govern-
ments listed on the JAG webpage. Id. In every state or U.S. territory, the governor or chief executive 
officer must appoint an agency, known as the State Administering Agency (SAA) to apply for and 
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with a calculation prepared by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which creates 
an initial allocation of funds to all fifty states and U.S. territories, based on 
each jurisdiction’s share of the nation’s violent crime and overall population.234 
Every state and U.S. territory is entitled to a minimum of 0.25 percent of the 
total JAG allocation, regardless of population or crime average; if a state or 
U.S. territory’s initial allocation exceeds the minimum amount, it receives the 
minimum award in addition to an award based on its share of violent crime and 
population.235 States receiving JAG funds are then required to set aside forty 
percent of those funds to be allocated to local governments.236 Local jurisdic-
tions are then awarded funding based on a calculation of their three-year crime 
averages.237 
The JAG Program application form for both state and local governments 
outlines several requirements, including a requirement that all applicants com-
ply with applicable federal laws; additional requirements exist for certain other 
programs as well.238 For example, the 2017 application form for state solicita-
tion provides that applicants requesting JAG funds to purchase body-worn 
camera equipment must certify that the agency using that equipment has im-
plemented policies and procedures regarding “equipment usage, data storage 
and access, privacy considerations, training, etc.”239 In order to incentivize in-
mate suicide prevention reform in state and local correctional facilities, the 
BJA should modify the JAG Program application requirements to similarly 
include a suicide prevention protocol prerequisite for applicants who are seek-
ing JAG funds for correctional purposes.240 
The suicide prevention protocol prerequisite would effectively condition 
correctional JAG funds on the implementation of comprehensive suicide pre-
                                                                                                                           
administer the JAG funds. State Administering Agencies, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. ASS’N, https://www.ncja.
org/ncja/policy/about-saas [https://perma.cc/AS6Q-ZF5X]. In New York, the SAA is the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services. State Criminal Justice Profile: New York, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2018), https://bjafactsheets.iir.com/State/NY 
[https://perma.cc/9V6X-2TG9]. 
 234 JAG TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 231, at 2. 
 235 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 3755(a) (providing the allocation formula). 
 236 42 U.S.C. § 3755(b); JAG TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 231, at 3. This sixty-forty percent 
split does not apply to the District of Columbia or any of the U.S. territories. JAG TECHNICAL RE-
PORT, supra note 231, at 3. 
 237 JAG TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 231, at 3. For JAG purposes, units of local government 
include towns, townships, villages, parishes, cities, counties, boroughs, and other subdivisions of a 
state. JAG FAQ, supra note 231, at 1. In some states, district attorneys or parish sheriffs may also be 
considered units of local government. Id. 
 238 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUS-
TICE ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM FY 2017 LOCAL SOLICITATION 6–9 (2017), https://www.bja.
gov/Funding/JAGState17.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG2A-X5MY] [hereinafter JAG 2017 LOCAL SOLICI-
TATION]; JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 6–10. 
 239 JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 6. 
 240 See id. (describing prerequisites for certain uses of JAG funds). 
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vention policies in the facilities that will be using the funds.241 State and local 
governments who can demonstrate that effective suicide prevention pro-
grams—i.e. programs that implement the above-discussed policies and proce-
dures—are utilized by their correctional facilities, will meet the suicide pre-
vention prerequisite necessary to receive correctional JAG funding.242 State 
and local governments who fail to demonstrate that their suicide prevention 
programs meet the standards previously discussed will not receive JAG correc-
tional funding.243 Given the rising costs of maintaining a corrections facility, 
this prerequisite would give JAG applicants seeking correctional funding a 
stronger incentive to implement suicide prevention protocols, thereby afford-
ing enhanced protection to inmates at risk of suicide in their jurisdictions.244 
In addition to adding this prerequisite for correctional funding requests, 
the BJA should also draw attention to the need for correctional suicide preven-
tion programming on future JAG Program application forms.245 In the 2017 
JAG Program state and local application forms, the BJA included a section 
entitled “BJA Areas of Emphasis.”246 Under this portion of the form in the 
state application, the BJA listed several prevalent criminal justice issues, and 
encouraged state and local recipients of JAG funds to increase resources and 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See id. (same). 
 242 See id. (same); supra notes 203–230 and accompanying text (discussing the components of an 
effective suicide prevention scheme). 
 243 See JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 6–8 (listing preconditions for using 
JAG funds in certain areas of criminal justice programming). The Department of Justice requires re-
cipients of its grants, including JAG, to submit financial reports detailing the expenditures and out-
standing bills for a project that is covered by grant funding. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2015 DOJ GRANTS FINANCIAL GUIDE 120, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/file/
892031/download [https://perma.cc/9ZGZ-KEYY]. These reports must be submitted online through 
the Grants Management System (GMS), no later than thirty days after the last day of each quarter of 
the project. Id. at 120–21. If the report is not submitted by the deadline, the GMS will prevent with-
drawal of funds through the Grants Payment Request System. Id. at 121. In addition to financial re-
ports, the DOJ requires grant recipients to submit progress/program reports describing the activities of 
an ongoing plan or project. Id. at 123. Progress/program reports should be submitted annually or semi-
annually, depending on the type of award, through the GMS. Id. Additionally, applicants requesting 
JAG funding for purchasing body-worn camera equipment are required to submit a signed certifica-
tion stating that law enforcement agencies receiving the equipment have implemented written “man-
datory wear” policies. JAG FAQ, supra note 231, at 11. 
 244 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE PRISON HEALTH CARE SPENDING 19 (July 2014), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/07/stateprisonhealthcarespendingreport.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZV7U-YXZR]. In 2015, grantees across the country allocated approximately 6% of their JAG 
awards toward corrections and community corrections programs, which was the third program area to 
which grantees invested the most JAG funds. JAG ACTIVITY REPORT, supra note 231, at 2. Law en-
forcement and prosecution, courts, and public defense were the top two program areas where grantees 
allocated JAG funding, with 64.2% for law enforcement and 9.9% for prosecution, courts, and public 
defense. Id. 
 245 See JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 10–11 (listing the “BJA Areas of 
Emphasis”). 
 246 JAG 2017 LOCAL SOLICITATION, supra note 238, at 9–10; JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, 
supra note 201, at 10–11. 
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reform towards those areas.247 In 2017, the priority areas listed were: (i) reduc-
ing gun violence; (ii) national incident-based reporting system; (iii) officer 
safety and wellness; (iv) border security; and (v) collaborative prosecution.248 
In order to encourage greater attention and investment towards inmate suicide 
prevention reform, the BJA should add correctional suicide prevention pro-
gramming to the list of JAG priority areas in future JAG Program application 
forms; as such, state and local governments will be aware that the federal gov-
ernment is willing to support improvement on this issue.249 
C. The Department of Justice Should Create a Discretionary Grant 
Program That Supports Inmate Suicide Prevention Reform 
In addition to offering broad-based criminal justice grants through the 
JAG Program, the DOJ should also create new discretionary grant opportuni-
ties specifically addressing the issue of inmate suicide.250 Discretionary grants 
awarded by the DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs are grants for state or local 
governments to use in addressing specific justice issues, and are often awarded 
on a competitive basis.251 Discretionary grants aimed at inmate suicide preven-
tion would offer state and local governments additional incentives and re-
sources to pursue that type of reform in their jurisdictions.252 
For example, the BJA had an application available in early 2017 for a 
competitive grant that would support the implementation of the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (“PREA”) to reduce sexual abuse and harassment in a local 
correctional system.253 The application form included details on what the re-
cipient of the grant would be expected to implement with the grant money, as 
well as a timeline according to which different phases of the project should be 
executed.254 It outlined expectations for the planning phase of the project—
such as identifying local confinement facilities in need of support to initiate 
PREA standards—and the implementation phase, including the introduction of 
sexual abuse victim support services.255 
Similarly, the BJA should create a discretionary grant program for state or 
local correctional facilities that are in need of additional support to implement 
                                                                                                                           
 247 JAG 2017 STATE SOLICITATION, supra note 201, at 10–11. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See id. (listing the BJA “Areas of Emphasis”). 
 250 See OJP Grant Process, supra note 202 (explaining what a discretionary grant is). 
 251 Id. 
 252 See id. (explaining what a discretionary grant is). 
 253 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREA PROGRAM: STRATEGIC 
SUPPORT FOR PREA IMPLEMENTATION IN LOCAL CONFINEMENT FACILITIES NATIONWIDE 4 (2017), 
https://www.bja.gov/Funding/PREA17.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ4F-DAY3] [hereinafter PREA PRO-
GRAM]. 
 254 Id. at 6–11. 
 255 Id. 
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effective inmate suicide prevention measures.256 As with the PREA grant, the 
inmate suicide prevention grant should include specific goals and objectives 
that the recipient agency would be required to fulfill.257 These goals and objec-
tives should focus on the key components of effective inmate suicide preven-
tion that have already been mentioned: (i) intake screenings containing a men-
tal health and suicide risk component, and continuing assessments of suicide 
risk, both conducted by qualified mental health professionals; (ii) initial and 
annual in-person suicide prevention trainings for correctional and mental 
health staff; (iii) collaboration between correctional and mental health staff, 
cultivated through joint meetings to discuss recent suicide incidents and issues; 
(iv) proper levels of observation by correctional officers for inmates at risk of 
suicide; (v) safe and suicide-resistant housing for at-risk inmates; (vi) prompt 
and appropriate intervention by correctional officers upon discovery of an in-
mate who has attempted suicide; and (vii) multidisciplinary morbidity-mortality 
reviews after each inmate suicide incident.258 
Adequate funding is essential in every jurisdiction to maintain and im-
prove a correctional system.259 Therefore, the above-mentioned modifications 
and additions to the DOJ’s JAG and other grant programs will encourage state 
and local governments to address the problem of inmate suicide, and will like-
ly lead to an increase in the prevalence of comprehensive inmate suicide pre-
vention programs across the nation.260 With the essential suicide prevention 
strategies in place, jails and prisons will have what it takes to prevent someone 
like Christopher Barkes from taking his or her own life.261 
CONCLUSION 
Inmate suicide is one of the most pressing issues in correctional systems 
nationwide, because it is the leading cause of death in local jails and the sec-
ond leading cause of death in state prisons. For a number of reasons, including 
the costliness of mental healthcare and complacency regarding inmate deaths, 
many correctional facilities do not have the comprehensive range of inmate 
suicide prevention programs that mental health experts recommend in order to 
reduce inmate suicides. Additionally, because of the qualified immunity doc-
                                                                                                                           
 256 See OJP Grant Process, supra note 202. See generally PREA PROGRAM, supra note 253 (of-
fering a grant application for the purposes of implementing PREA standards in correctional facilities). 
 257 See PREA PROGRAM, supra note 253, at 6–11. 
 258 See supra notes 203–230 and accompanying text. 
 259 See Hanson, supra note 36, at 7; STATE PRISON HEALTH CARE SPENDING, supra note 244, at 
19 (showing a peak in correctional healthcare spending in 2009 at $8.2 billion, and a slightly lower 
amount of $7.7 billion in 2011). 
 260 See Hanson, supra note 36, at 7; STATE PRISON HEALTH CARE SPENDING, supra note 244. 
 261 See supra notes 203–230 and accompanying text. 
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trine, correctional authorities are shielded from liability even when their failure 
to implement suicide prevention measures results in an inmate death. 
To address the lack of progress in inmate suicide prevention, the federal 
government should intervene by incentivizing enhanced efforts by state and 
local governments nationwide toward inmate suicide prevention reform. The 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) should require state and local governments 
who request funding for correctional purposes through the Justice Assistance 
Grant (“JAG”) Program to have comprehensive suicide prevention programs in 
effect in their jurisdictions’ correctional facilities. The DOJ should also en-
courage JAG applicants to spend their funding on inmate suicide prevention 
reform, by including the issue on its list of areas of emphasis on future JAG 
application forms. Finally, the DOJ should establish new discretionary grants 
that offer additional funds to state and local agencies to support their imple-
mentation of comprehensive inmate suicide prevention program in jails and 
prisons. 
An effective corrections system should aim at rehabilitating the lives of 
those who have become involved in the criminal justice system, so that they 
can rejoin their communities and flourish in them. This cannot happen if jails 
and prisons are places where inmates are left to fall prey to their environment 
and to their own mental illnesses. Therefore, inmate suicide prevention efforts 
are essential to the function and operation of a successful corrections system, 
and should be encouraged, supported, and urged in the most effective ways 
possible. Only then can a corrections system truly be engaged in restorative 
efforts. 
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